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"A thought, then, which negates another thought is neither more nor less significant than a physical law which negates another physical law."

We have tried to give an abstract of the author's views as we understand them. We have not indicated in any degree the ingenious way in which the argument is presented, nor have we hinted at the apt illustration, the pleasing metaphor, the friendly sarcasm which abounds throughout. Our principal objection is that he writes as an advocate, and not in the dispassionate way in which scientific theories should be discussed. The acceptance of the argument as it stands means the acceptance of new theories of vision and audition, of a new kind of form-quality—to say nothing of the old, of a thorough-going atomism, and of a strange theory of consciousness. The author would agree that the only test of a theory is an appeal to the facts; we wish that he had at least indicated how his theory of vision would explain simultaneous contrast. Again, it is not quite fair, where there is some disagreement as to what are the facts, to choose one set of observations and entirely to ignore the others. For example, there are psychologists, who are aware of the stimulus-error and who work with spectral colors, and not with pigments, who still insist that orange is a simple quality. There is also good reason for believing that the rods are organs of night vision only. In which case the cones, according to the novel theory, must resonate to white light. What would a resonator, tuned to a pair of wave-lengths, do with so complex a wave as that of white light? The author cannot say that each resonator picks out its own wave-length, for the retina would then be an analyser, and that would imply specific nerve-energies. Moreover, we should, in such case, be able to analyse mentally white light as we do a clang. Similar objections might be raised against the theory of hearing; we will only remark that Wundt, twenty years ago, considered such a theory, but declined to accept it because it cannot satisfactorily explain clang-analysis. As regards the view of secondary qualities as densities, one can only speculate. The sole evidence which the author brings to the support of his theory, the roughness and smoothness of the tapping experiment or of the flicker experiment, is hardly germane; for roughness and smoothness are not simple qualities, as is the quality of a color or a tonal sensation. If, however, we were to hazard a guess, we should agree with Montague that the author has given us an interesting explanation of intensity, but not an explanation of quality at all. As to form-qualities there is still the possibility, as Titchener has pointed out, that the problem of meaning is involved; so that, just as no content can of itself assert anything, so none can mean anything,—not even triangularity.

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*Das Problem der Willensfreiheit.* Von G. F. LIPPS. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1912. pp. iv, 104.

This booklet, published in the series "*Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*," is based on *Volkschulvorträge* delivered by the author at the University of Leipzig. Lipps accepts Kant's statement of the problem of freedom: that man is at once free and determined; but he seeks a solution more adequate than that of Kant. Instead of splitting hairs over the meaning of Freedom and Determinism, the author proposes to examine the essence of our own being and conduct, in an endeavor to solve thereby the puzzle of the free-determined character of our willing and acting. To this end, he presents in brief outline the part

played by reason in various Greek theories; Augustine's doctrine of the good and the bad will, and the modern rationalistic accounts of the relations of mind and body. Kant, he thinks, is enabled to hold causality and freedom side by side, only by lifting morality out of the world of phenomena, and thus making man a member of two universes. The relation between these two human natures remains a mystery for German idealism; that mystery Lipps seeks to grasp in terms of actuality. As thinking beings, he holds, we are convinced of the thoroughly necessary character of human conduct. Man must act in the way in which he does act. The preconditions of each act, however, can never be completely indicated; and this inevitable residuum of uncertainty leads us naïvely to postulate a will essentially free. Thus the problem of freedom and determinism, Lipps concludes, involves the discrimination between the naïve and the critical attitude towards human conduct.

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*Ethics.* By G. E. MOORE. New York, Henry Holt and Company; London, Williams and Norgate, 1912, pp. 256.

The aim of the author is "to state and distinguish clearly from one another . . . the most important of the different views which may be held upon a few of the most fundamental ethical questions" (p. 11). This he attempts to do by devoting a third of his book to an analytic statement of utilitarianism, and the remaining two-thirds to an examination of possible criticisms of that theory. Moore defends utilitarianism against the line of attack which consists in saying that right and wrong are merely subjective predicates. To say that an action is right or wrong, intrinsically good or bad, is not to say that one has towards it any mental attitude whatever. Nor is there sufficient reason for accepting as the test of right and wrong the intrinsic nature of the action, the motive prompting it, or its probable consequences. The discussion of free will "concludes with a doubt" (p. 222). The egoistic objection to utilitarianism is likewise rejected; but after disposing of all other criticisms of that theory, Moore advances his own, which he considers fatal; utilitarianism claims that rightness and wrongness depend on the intrinsic value of the consequences of our actions, and yet it does not rightly decide what constitutes intrinsic value.

The book is intended for the lay reader; the continual iteration of apparently simple ideas seems to indicate that the author was perhaps too well aware of his task as popularizer. The central place which is given to utilitarianism doubtless provides a convenient opportunity for presenting the author's own point of view in minute and finely spun reflections on hedonism; but it leaves the reader with a wrong historical perspective of ethical theory. The method of exposition, also, is unfortunate: the popular reader is offered hairsplitting distinctions and abstract explanations in terms of the conventional *A* and *B*. Unduly replete with technicalities which are out of place in an elementary treatise, and lacking almost any concrete illustrations from daily life, this book is at once too subtle and too dry for its purpose.

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*Elemente der Völkerpsychologie, Grundlinien einer psychologischen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit.* Von WILHELM WUNDT. Zweite unveränderte Auflage. Leipzig, A. Kröner, 1913. pp. xii, 523. M. 14.

The monumental volumes of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* find not only a summary but also a crowning supplement in the *Elemente der Völker-*